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Abstract
This article explores a number-based comparative logic unfolding around a particular kind of meeting in a social work
setting: a daily and short gathering referred to as a “pulse meeting”. At such meetings, staff gather around a whiteboard
visualizing individual statistics in terms of the number of client meetings performed or assistance decisions made. The
statistics function as a basis for further division of work tasks. As such, it is a particular way of representing what social
workers do at work. Ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the social services revealed how such openly exposed individ-
ual performance and the related number-based comparative logic can trump alternative logics ranging from the overall
collective performance, competing views on clients’ needs and efficiency, and the social worker’s sense of professional-
ism. When participants of the study compared themselves to each other and in relation to standards and goals, certain
conclusions were drawn about what should be done by whom and in what order. Such conclusions became embedded
in an objectivity status difficult for anyone to argue against. Finally, the number-based logic also found its way into the
counter-practices formulated by social workers unsatisfied with what was visualized on the whiteboard.
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1. Introduction
Different kinds of numbers are used in many different
ways in modern professional practices, such as social
work (Shore & Wright, 2015, p. 23). At an early plan-
ning stage, a social work organizationmay decide to send
out a survey to do an inventory of needs to prioritize in
a certain community. In direct client work, social work-
ers use assessment forms to gather information about
a client’s social and psychological status. Time is mea-
sured in terms of the hours and minutes it takes for
the elderly and disabled to shower or clean their house
in order to calculate their assistance need. As employ-
ees, social workers themselves fill out work environment
surveys and discuss the results presented in diagrams
at staff meetings. Numeric information about anything
from gender representation to the costs and effects of
interventions are reported to management, politicians,
and government authorities. As Kurunmäki and Miller
(2006) point out, to be able to work and operate in mod-
ern organizations, one needs to acquire an administra-
tive and “calculating” knowledge. One needs to continu-
ously use, interpret, compare, and value work with the
help of numbers.
The role that measurements should have in social
work practice is debatable. Measuring initiatives are of-
ten accompanied by efforts to gain objective and neu-
tral knowledge—knowing “for real” as opposed to feel-
ing and guessing (Martinell Barfoed & Jacobsson, 2012;
Porter, 1994). Such efforts can be challenging, as the
character and goals of this work are constantly chang-
ing, varied, nuanced, complex, vague, uncertain, and
filled with conflicts and dilemmas (Parton, 1998). While
some scholars, authorities, and practitioners invent and
spread models for measuring new aspects of social
work (e.g., Elg, Witell, & Gauthereau, 2007; National
Board of Health and Welfare, 2014), others insist that
such measurements reduce complexity (e.g., Liedman,
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2013) and risk making robots out of the practitioners
(Baines, 2006).
One specific way of using numbers in work settings is
tomeasure and compare professionals’ individual perfor-
mances in order to monitor that work is done according
to predefined and quantified standards and goals. A con-
crete example is to set a standard of how many clients a
social worker should attend per day, and to connect fund-
ing to the level of compliance with the standard. This use
of numbers as a governance tool directly affects profes-
sionals in their everyday work. It is described as some-
thing relatively new for the public sector, belonging to
reforms called New Public Management (Hood, 1991) or
managerialism (Pollitt, 1993). A metaphor often used to
describe the content of such reforms is that managers
start “steering the boat”, focusing on goal fulfilment, in-
stead of “rowing it” by focusing on quality in the pro-
cesses. Rowing includes letting professionals’ praxis im-
plicitly define the standards, whereas steering implies
formal and quantitative measures (Hood, 1991, p. 4).
Authorities and employers’ organizations tend to ar-
gue that performance measures are a good way to guar-
antee transparency, value for money, and legal secu-
rity (SALAR, 2014). On the other hand, studies point to
several unintended or “perverse” effects of using such
strategies to steer professionals, all relating to the say-
ing “what gets measured gets done” (Bevan & Hood,
2006). Some examples are cherry-picking easily treated
clients (Gilman, 2001, p. 601), double booking clients
to achieve higher visiting rates (Gallina, 2010, pp. 2–4),
“parking” clients in available programs rather than pro-
grams known to be efficient and worthwhile (Brodkin,
2011, p. 67), playing “tick-box games” when reporting
statistics (McGivern & Ferlie, 2007, p. 1378), and staff de-
veloping a “silo-mentality” of being less inclined to collab-
orate with colleagues (Lodge & Gill, 2011, pp. 153–155).
The research mentioned above addresses restructur-
ing changes in different professional contexts, such as
management, health care, and social work, and com-
monly has the role of numbers and quantification to be
one of several aspects distinguishing the reforms. This
text takes a closer look at the function of numbers, in in-
teractions, negotiations, and practices unfolding around
performance measures in a social work setting. For this
reason, the analyses will build on data on interactions
at so-called “pulse meetings”, at which managers gather
their staff around a whiteboard visualizing individual per-
formances and relating them to standards and quanti-
fied goals. This is a strategy rooted in “lean manage-
ment”, translating efficiency success from the car indus-
try to public sector work, such as health care, social
services, and education (Baines, Charlesworth, Turner,
& O’Neill, 2014). While some studies have investigated
consequences and changes related to performance mea-
surements in social work practice (e.g., Abramovitz &
Zelnick, 2015; Baines, 2006; Brodkin, 2011) and similar
“whiteboard management”, mainly in hospital settings
(Hauge, 2016; Stray, Sjøberg, & Dybå, 2016), this study
particularly focuses interaction related to comparisons
of professionals based on numerically described perfor-
mance. As Espeland and Stevens (2008) point out re-
garding measurements in general, they are always so-
cially transformative to some extent. Complexity is re-
duced to enable comparisons over time and between
agents, and in the next step the comparisons lead to val-
ues and actions. The purpose of this article is to analyze
what conclusions professionals draw and what actions
they take when they are exposed to statistics at pulse
meetings. More specifically, how is this visible in the par-
ticipants’ interactions? This focus resonates with other
scholars (cf. Timmermans & Epstein, 2010, p. 78) high-
lighting the importance to empirically investigate and dis-
cuss expected, as well as unforeseen and unintended,
consequences of governing initiatives containing differ-
ent kinds of standards and numbers.
2. A Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Governing
Number Practices
A sociology of knowledge and quantification perspective
is of overall relevance to this study. As scholars writ-
ing from this standpoint (e.g., Best, 2001; Espeland &
Stevens, 2008; Porter, 1994) commonly argue, I look at
numbers and statistics as a knowledge form that is con-
structed and used for different purposes. What numbers
reflect and represent is a product of social negotiation
and interactive processes, and once produced they influ-
ence and affect their social surroundings.
From this perspective, questions can be asked re-
garding what is done with and accomplished by num-
bers, by whom and in what way (Espeland & Stevens,
2008). One of several approaches to these questions
that has already been elaborated theoretically is that cit-
izens in general and professionals in particular are “gov-
erned by numbers”. Within this theoretical framework,
statistics, indicators, audit projects, budgets, evaluations,
standards, and ranking systems are seen as tools used
by the government to discipline society, yet simultane-
ously “hide” or make the power exercise less explicit
(Miller & Rose, 1990; Power, 2004; Rose, 1991). A com-
mon reference is Foucault’s conceptualization of “gov-
ernmentality” (Foucault, 1978/1991, p. 100), referring
to a strong yet indirect and distanced form of political
power, not least employedwithin neoliberal government
(Dean, 1999, p. 1). Governmentality partlyworks through
“government of the self”, in which the above mentioned
and often subtle tools create instructions on how to feel,
think, and act. In this sense, one can say that profes-
sionals participate in governing over themselves (Rose,
Valverde, & O’Malley, 2006. p. 89). In the analyses of this
article, the whiteboard used for comparing performance
is approached as such a tool.
At the same time, even though such governance
projects are implemented “from above”, their actual
role, function, or meaning is achieved socially. What
becomes of such initiatives is a result of negotiations,
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adjustments, and translations to local practices, and
there can also be resistance and countermoves (Saet-
nan, Lomell, & Hammer, 2011, p. 11). O’Malley, Weir
and Shearing (1997, pp. 504–505) pointed out as a weak-
ness in contemporary governmentality literature, the
tendency to ignore the often messy, contradictory and
tense reality where the governing takes place. Instead,
intentions from government or management are put
at the center and presented in schematic and abstract
ways. Resistance from citizens or employees becomes
a matter of obstacles, deviances or failures to be over-
come, and is not seen as part of negotiations inherent
to all kind of governing with potential to shape and
influence the governments’ intentions (O’Malley et al.,
1997, p. 510). Thus, governmentality ideas have been
criticized for downplaying the agency of the profession-
als and alternative approaches have been suggested (see
Paulsen, 2014, pp. 39–72) in order to capture workplace
resistance. Ackroyd and Thompson (1999, p. 6) who pro-
vided one such approach argued that even in organi-
zational contexts where management and control sys-
tems are more sophisticated, resistance—or what they
call misbehavior—takes on new forms rather than disap-
pears. For the present study, recently developed ideas to
study (among other things) workplace resistance, coined
by Bruno, Didier and Vitale (2014) as “statactivism”, have
inspired the analysis. Statactivism is defined as “a partic-
ular form of actionwithin the repertoire used by contem-
porary social movements: the mobilization of statistics”
(Bruno et al., 2014, p. 198). The resistance strategies
consist of countering a quantification stemming from
the state, an authority or an organization’s management,
with alternative and affirmative or nuancing and ques-
tioning quantification. Within this framework authors
have identified several more specific ways of using num-
bers to exercise influence “from below”. Whereas the
creators of the statactivist approach have an emancipa-
tory purpose documenting those strategies (Bruno et al.,
2014, p. 200), this article uses their framework for under-
standing the possibilities and limitations of this particu-
lar kind of resistance.
The above-mentioned ideas guide the analysis of this
study in the way that practices in terms of reactions,
actions, conclusions, clashes, and counter-practices to
governing intentions are at the center of attention. In
that sense, a theoretical contribution is made to govern-
mentality theory through the identification of moments
where governing intentions clashes with or are disrupted
by resistance or alternative logics stemming from the so-
cial workers, as well as how such tension plays out in the
everyday interaction.
3. Ethnographic Fieldwork in a Social Service Setting
With the overall aim to study practices unfolding around
a governing initiative in a work setting, an ethnographic
approach was selected as a research strategy (Neyland,
2008, p. 4). Over seven months in 2017 (from January
to July) I conducted ethnographic field work (participant
observations, interviews, documents, and photographs)
at five different social service offices in Sweden. The aim
was to identify and study situations in which participants
interacted aroundnumbers related towork performance.
I shadowedmanagers participating in leadership courses,
and I observed and interviewed social workers, adminis-
trative staff, and managers during “ordinary” work days.
Out of the more comprehensive material from the field-
work, this article draws on data from one of the stud-
ied units in which the management had taken inspira-
tion from lean management. The data consist of field
notes from five full-day observations, four individual in-
terviews, two pair-interviews, and a selection of docu-
ments and photographs.
As a participant observer, I did not exclusively strive
to be a “fly on the wall” or a fully participating mem-
ber, which can be considered the two extremes within
ethnography (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011, pp. 1–3;
Fine, 1993, p. 281). During observations, participation al-
tered from at times being more restrained, in line with
what Czarniawska (2007, p. 21) calls “shadowing”, to
other times being more active, including taking part in
participants’ discussions and decisions (Atkinson, 2015,
p. 39). Strategic decisions about the level of participation
were made situationally. An overall aim of using partici-
pation as a means to get access to participants thoughts
and feelings (Fine, 1993, p. 282) had to be adjusted to
what was possible in specific situations. At some occa-
sions, as in smaller management meetings, a high level
of participation seemed to make the participants more
comfortable with my presence. In other moments, such
as bigger staff gatherings including the “pulse meetings”
to be described in the next section, less interference
seemed expedient. Observations with a “passive” partici-
patory approach enabled detailed field notes to be taken
in place.When participation wasmore active, field notes
had to be complemented afterwards.
During fieldwork I applied interviewing in two
different ways. Combined with observations, “mini-
interviews” were continuously conducted with several
participants in order to enhance my own understand-
ing of interactions taking place and how they were per-
ceived by the participants. Such data were written down
by hand, forming part of the field notes. Longer inter-
views were tape-recorded and made with the help of a
thematic interview guide.
After transcribing interviews and field notes, a qual-
itative content analysis was initiated. In a first step, the
data were thematically coded along several themes that
had emerged during fieldwork, as well as when transcrib-
ing and reading the interviews and field notes. In a sec-
ond step, the data were re-coded along a fewer set of
selected themes. Even though the interest in “number-
based governance” was present already at the beginning
of the fieldwork, the results presented in this article have
emerged through a process of interpretation where data
collection, the reading of previous research and theory,
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and analyzing have been altered in a so called “iterative
strategy” (Dellgran & Höjer, 2003, p. 11).
I have collected all the data used in this article, al-
though being part of the research project “Documents,
Forms and Paperwork—Expanding Documenting Prac-
tices in Health Care and Social Work” led by Katarina
Jacobsson and Elizabeth Martinell Barfoed at Lund Uni-
versity in Sweden. The project has been approved by the
Swedish Regional Ethical Review Board (Dnr 2013/348).
I obtained access to the field initially by approaching rep-
resentatives of the social services’ management. Prior
to the field work all participants were informed about
the study, either at staff meetings or through internal e-
mail correspondence. In the selection of participants for
recorded interviews I strived to get a mix of managers
and social workers, as well as participants with varying
amount of years of experience in the field. It was volun-
tary for those asked to give the interviews and some de-
clined with reference to heavy work load. In line with the
codes of research ethics, already in the field notes and
transcriptions, alternative names were given to the par-
ticipants and the municipalities. All names appearing in
this article, including the whiteboard on page 5, are ficti-
tious. The observations have mainly been concentrated
on the professionals and not the social work clients.
When participants have been talking about clients, no
confident details were written down.
The language in all of the gathered material is
Swedish. For the present analysis, selected extracts of
the data have been translated from Swedish into English
by me.
4. Lean Management and the Function of Numbers
4.1. Whiteboard Statistics for Efficient Assistance
Assessment
At the current social service unit, the socialworkers’main
task was to assess clients’ (elderly, disabled, and very
sick people) rights to assistance in terms of home care
activities (i.e., cleaning, shopping, going to bathroom) or
shorter or longer stays in nursing homes. Approximately
a year before the fieldwork, the management took inspi-
ration from lean management to streamline and speed
up the work. According to the management, problems
motivating new strategieswere high caseloads, longwait-
ing times for clients, and an overall ineffective working
culture in which the professionals watched their own
territories instead of collaborating in an efficient way.
Among other things the social workers struggled with
completing required documentation on time and often
had to push required follow-up visits into the future.
Briefly, leanmanagement is an efficiencymodel used
increasingly in public service organizations, the inspira-
tion for which comes from success in the car industry
(Baines et al., 2014). The model seeks increased produc-
tivity through the identification of “time thieves” and
the most resource efficient way to complete tasks with-
out negotiating quality. Standardization of time-frames,
caseloads, and activities is themain strategy used to stim-
ulate what is called “the flow”, referring to a case’s way
through the organization. In the car industry this process,
in terms of the “line of production”, could be described
as the steps running “from ordered to delivered car”. The
corresponding course for incoming cases at the current
social service unit would be “from application to denial
or followed up approval of assistance”. The aim is for this
process to run “smoothly” without friction and the qual-
ity of the product or service is guaranteed by the rou-
tinized procedures (Petersson et al., 2012, p. 51).
Michel Power (1997) explains that work or services in
general can be judged, evaluated or audited based on dif-
ferent kinds of, and sometimes competing, logics such as
its efficiency or its effectiveness (Power, 1997, p. 50–51).
While the former is concerned with determining “value
for money” in terms of ensuring maximum output from
available resources, the latter is oriented towards eval-
uating if outcomes conform qualitatively to intentions,
as defined in laws, policies and programs. In social work
such outcomes can be ambiguous and controversial and
are constantly being negotiated amongst professionals
(Power, 1997, p. 117). Lean management honors rou-
tinized procedures, which are meant to guarantee qual-
ity. Still, the quality standards, for example in terms of
caseload per social worker, specify a lower and an upper
limit for how much work the social worker is allowed to
invest in each case in order to keep the “production” at
a high and steady pace. This makes the model more con-
cerned with efficiency rather than with effectiveness.
Numbers have a distinguished role in lean manage-
ment in the way that work content is described quanti-
tatively and measured against quantified goals and stan-
dards. For example, standards for how much or how
many meetings the professionals are expected to “pro-
duce” per day are established. Numbers are used to vi-
sualize how the staff is performing on an individual basis.
A big whiteboard, or a “pulse-board”, as the participants
in this study called it, with such statistics is often put in
a select place where staff can easily gather. It was de-
scribed by a manager as a “visual protocol of decisions
and ongoing activities”. What is measured and visualized
on the whiteboard varies according to the tasks being ex-
ecuted. At the current social service office, it even varied
between the different teams into which the social work-
ers were divided.
4.2. Taking the Pulse of the Social Workers
Everymorning at 8 am, five work teams gathered around
five whiteboards for a 15-minute meeting, standing on
their feet. One manager explained: “Sitting down would
make the staff too comfortable”. For one team, the board
looked like Figure 1 (after my reconstruction, translation
and anonymization).
In the first column from the left, the social workers
are listed by name, designating rows that account for ac-
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Figure 1.Whiteboard for Team 2.
tivities scheduled for each day of the week. For example,
Eva, who is listed first, will make one home visit on Mon-
day at the same time as she is covering for Stig, who is ill.
Jonna has planned to finish the documentation of one as-
sessment as well as going on one home visit. The second
column from the right indicates their respective “lag”,
representing the number of assistance decisions made
but yet not documented. A standard was decided of max-
imum fifteen investigations “lagging” before the man-
agers would actively “take action”. Finally, the last col-
umn to the right states how many “follow-up-meetings”
the social worker had completed so far that month.
Next to every social workers’ name are marks repre-
senting the number of days that the social worker has
covered for a colleague who is ill or had to take on
an urgent matter. For example, Eva has covered for a
colleague one day, whereas Viveka has covered for col-
leagues four days. The visualization of the extra burden
of handling absent colleagues’ tasks was an initiative
from the staff and not part of the initial pulse board logic,
something I will elaborate further below.
The pulse meetings are led by a front-line manager
with the intention of “taking the pulse” of the staff. The
manager asks every social worker about their plans for
the day and if they need help. How they are perform-
ing in relation to the standards and compliance is rou-
tinely commented on and celebrated. Scrutinizing indi-
vidual schedules helps the manager determine if work
is equally distributed. If one of the social workers has a
“calmer” day, themanager can actively engage himor her
in helping a colleague who needs help. This strategy res-
onates with one of lean management’s slogans, “putting
the team first”. According to this philosophy, the main
purpose is not to stimulate competition between social
workers for individual gains, but to use it forwork division
for the team’s common goal performance. Numbers are
used for social control where work is divided based on a
number-based solidarity.
Information about clients or the content and result of
the activities performed is not exchanged at these meet-
ings that strictly report performance in relation to stan-
dards and goals. For example, the manager does not ask
questions about how a client is doing or what was de-
cided at a home visit. Such information was addressed in
other forums when necessary. In Hauge’s (2016) words,
this “whiteboard management” represents a specific
way of visualizing and valuing work in organizations
where parallel working value systems, related to profes-
sionals’ traditions, norms and work ethics, exist.
5. Findings
5.1. Comparisons as Technologies of the Self
The pulse meetings can be viewed as an occasion for the
management to check that the social workers read the in-
formation on the board correctly. Through a meeting rit-
ual in which increased or improved numbers get praise
and future activities are steered towards goal fulfilment,
the manager gives clues as to what conclusions should
be drawn. However, the actual comparisons started even
earlier by the social workers themselves. Thoughts and
ideas about what should be done by whom already ap-
pear in the earliest interaction between the observer and
the board that seem to give silent instructions for actions.
A simplified pulse board can serve our analysis (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Simplified whiteboard.
From a quick glance at the board, even an outsider
can get some idea about the supposed work distribu-
tion. You may note that Lena should work on her lag
and Stina on the follow-up visits. Stig, on the other hand,
is on a good course and can feel satisfied for the mo-
ment. The social workers who have more information
about the workmay read something else from the board.
Putting together different numbers into an overall work
description, connecting them to the standards and goals,
the picture becomes a bit more complex. They may con-
clude that Lena is behind because she has covered four
times for a colleague, and that Eva is closer than the oth-
ers to the standard limit for documentations lagging. In
any case, the result is a determination of who needs to
do what in what order. When the social workers look at
the board and start comparing themselves to their col-
leagues, certain emotions seem to be created, which are
reflected in the following quote from an interview with
social workers Jeanette and Lidia:
If you yourself have zero cases lagging it makes you
happy. But if your colleague has zero while you have
twenty, then it doesn’t feel that good [laughs a little].
Then you feel like…damn it! (Social worker Jeanette)
Even though it is a hypothetical situation that Jeanette is
describing, the point she is making is that she would give
herself a lower ranking based on her relatively higher
number of incomplete documentations. The connection
is simple; feelings of being “superior” or “inferior” stem
from having “more” or “less” than colleagues. That such
emotions can be converted to initiatives to act is appar-
ent in Lidia’s posture later in the same interview. When
asked if there were many negotiations regarding who
should cover for a sick colleague, she answered: “No,
that is not necessary, it is visible on the board”. Later in
the interview she stated:
You take a look at the pulse board and you see that
someone else has covered two days for someone, and
you know that you haven’t covered yourself, it is natu-
ral to volunteer to cover the next time. (Social worker
Lidia)
With the phrasing “it is natural to”, Lidia presents the con-
clusion drawn in terms of offering to cover as something
unquestionable and obvious. The examples above show
how the numbers on the board create both emotions
and actions, something that Foucault (1988) and his fol-
lowers (see Rose et al., 2006, p. 89) may call “governing
through technologies of the self”. Some select and mea-
surable aspects of the social workers’ performances have
been visualized on the board. Once the performances of
the social workers are compared in this way, a valuation
or rating can be applied (Espeland & Stevens, 2008). The
fact that this can be purposeful in the governing of pro-
fessionals is reflected in the following quote from an in-
terview with case worker Lisa. It seems that she almost
automatically, and by herself, draws the intended conclu-
sions from looking at the board:
I want to put an emphasis on the follow-up meetings,
now that they are so visible. I mean, I knew before
that I didn’t keep up with them, but I pushed that
stress away, but now you see it every day….My pri-
orities have changed, now I want to be on time with
what is visible on the board. (Social worker Lisa)
Lisa describes a switched focus and ascribes it to what is
visible on the board, something that has given her guid-
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ance. Just as Rosengren (2015, p. 12) points out, when
work is characterized by tasks that are not easily mea-
sured, what still can be visualized, such as keeping stan-
dards, tends to get symbolic and high importance. It be-
comes a concrete way in which social workers can prove
their engagement.
5.2. Collective and Individual Performance
As has been described earlier, team work is encouraged
in models such as lean management in the name of effi-
ciency (Baines et al., 2014, p. 447). Comparisons of so-
cial workers’ performances are accounted for because
it can enable a fair work distribution. At the same time,
the exposed numbers seem to open the door to a dis-
tracted focus on personal performance in comparison
to colleagues. In an observational study of pulse meet-
ings in hospital settings, Stray et al. (2016) observed how
the reporting and defending of individual work perfor-
mancemade employees uncomfortablewhile they simul-
taneously became more self-centered. Meetings were
spent thinking about how to account for their ownperfor-
mance instead of participating in joint discussions. A sim-
ilar process from my study shows that, for the individual
social worker, their own performance can trump the col-
lective effort as the motivating force. In one interview,
social workers Tanja and Krister were discussing a feel-
ing of satisfaction connected to improving ones’ num-
bers when they are asked if it would feel just as good to
change the numbers on the board if someone else had
helped them out:
Tanja: No, definitely not! Then it would not be my
performance….I would have to be extremely over-
whelmed with work to ask for help...
Krister: Yes….I’d rather work overtime myself.
Tanja: Yes...you always try to fix it yourself first, even
in the second place you want to do it yourself, only
thirdly I would ask for help. I mean, you want to do
your job…
In this case, hypothetical numbers giving instructions to
hand over cases to a colleague are described as a threat
to the sense of “professional pride” reflected in Tanja and
Krister’s statements. In a study of Canadian social work-
ers, Baines (2006) found different adaptive strategies for
meeting requirements of quantified care plans while si-
multaneously fulfilling their own sense of professional-
ism towards the clients. One strategywas towork unpaid
overtime, as is alsomentioned in the above quoted inter-
view, although from a slightly different standpoint: that
of being one who “does her job”. Krister and Tanja’s aver-
sion of letting go of cases illustrates their image of them-
selves as “performers”. Parallel to management’s goals
of teamwork, there seems to be a strong individualized
performance agenda.
Even though some sacrifices are described, such as
working overtime, the actions taken in the examples
this far are in line with the management’s intentions.
The respondents describe getting stressed when lag-
ging behind and generally seem to read the board ac-
cording to intentions. The respondents all possess the
ability to compare and calculate their own and oth-
ers’ performances. In other words, they have developed
what Kurunmäki and Miller (2006, p. 88) call “calculat-
ing selves”, postures that modern organizations seek and
value. The governing by numbers can be said to run
smoothly. However, this was not always the case, and
the front-line managers had to take on the role as media-
tors of the numbers. This is the themeof the next section,
in which social worker Vera argues against the messages
of the pulse board and offers persistent resistance.
5.3. Arguing over Numbers
Social worker Vera acted with reluctance towards the in-
structions on the pulse board. She did not seem to feel
stressed by numbers indicating that shewas far behind in
her documentation work, and she did not want to hand
over cases to a colleague in order to fulfil the adminis-
trative requirements. This frustrated the managers and,
at one pulse meeting, manager Pelle took on the role of
spokesperson for the numbers. In a long discussion be-
tween Pelle, Vera, and her teammate Susan, Pelle contin-
uously referred to Vera’s comparatively “bad” statistics in
order to influence her priorities, starting with:
Pelle: Yes, yes. I am thinking that all the new cases
coming in should be Susan’s, since you have nineteen
ongoing cases and Susan has sixteen, and on top of
that you have ten [points hard at the number ten on
the board, making a sound] documentations lagging
and Susan has zero. We have to look at the numbers
and compare.
Vera: But I gave you one case, right? [turning to Susan]
(Field note from pulse meeting, continues)
According to Pelle, the board shows that Vera should not
take on any new cases. Vera tries carefully to nuance the
statistics on the board. The statement that Susan already
has gotten one of her cases is another way of saying that
her statistics are not as bad as they look. Later in the di-
alogue, she similarly argues that she has cases that will
soon be closed that will make her results look better. In
the continuous dialogue, when Pelle suggests that she
should hand over some cases, and Susan volunteers to
take two of her documentations, Vera’s response is:
Well, I understand that Susan wants to help me, but
I thought that maybe we can solve this another way,
because I don’t think it’s good if we mix the cases.
The whole idea with creating our teamwas continuity
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for the clients. If she starts taking cases from me and
I from her, I don’t think it is good for the clients, and
also not time-wise, because I will have to be at even
more different places. I will be running around every-
where! (Field note from pulse meeting, continues)
Two arguments are put forth in this phrase. First, in terms
of what could be framed as a client perspective, referring
to “the continuity for the clients”. If they mix cases the
clientwill get different social workers towhom theymust
relate. Furthermore, Vera perceives it as impractical and
difficult for herself, as she’ll be “running around every-
where”. However, none of these arguments had any ef-
fect on Pelle, who keeps on referring to the numbers:
Pelle: Ok, so how are you going to solve it then, be-
cause you are not performing well here, Vera!
Vera: Hm, ok, Susan can take the applications to pri-
vate nursing homes, I don’t care as much about them.
Pelle: Then it is decided. And by tomorrow I want
those numbers to be more equal. Do you feel OK with
this Vera?
Vera: Well, I actually don’t want to let go of my cases,
I want to be able to make it on my own
(Field note from pulse meeting)
Finally, a statement is released that may be the most es-
sential one in relation to Vera’s reluctance, somethingwe
might call “professional pride”, when she says: “I don’t
want to let go of my cases, I want to make it on my own”.
To summarize, in at least four different ways Vera ar-
gues against Pelle in order to keep on working according
to her own plans: that the numbers do not reflect her
“real”work load, that it is not good for the clients’ continu-
ity to switch social workers, that it is not practical for her
and Susan, and finally a reference to professional pride
and responsibility. Vera offers resistance consisting of not
accepting and even offering alternative interpretations to
the one presented by the pulse board. Even though she
eventually compromises partially, it is with reluctance
and there is no sign that she accepts the logic of the num-
bers. Pelle does not respond with counter-arguments to
these substantive questions, but keeps on referring to the
numbers, which he uses “factually”: “I mean we have to
look at the numbers and compare”. The numbers seem to
be above all other circumstances that can potentially ex-
plain why Vera has bad statistics. It becomes a matter of
Vera’s “subjective qualitative arguments” against Pelle’s
“objective numbers argument”.
As Porter (1994, p. 225) points out, what appears
objective always means that someone has to sacrifice
some kind of meaning. In this case, Vera has to sacri-
fice the control she wants over her cases. However, sev-
eral arguments, values, and positions as subjective as
Vera’s can be found behind the numbers on the board,
in the managements’ rhetoric, and decisions on how
to measure. For example, I described earlier how man-
agers talked about social workers “watching their own
territory”, which they thought counteracted fair resource
allocation. What is really at stake then are different
and conflicting views on how to prioritize in which one
side (social worker) highlights professional ambition and
responsibility, user continuity, and pragmatic reasons
for the professional, and the other side (management)
highlights efficiency and equal distribution of resources.
The numbers create the gap, enabling the conflict to
never reach the surface. Considering the pulse boards in
these examples as Foucauldian “governmentality tactics”
(Foucault, 1978/1991, p. 95), the dimension that the ac-
tual governance is somewhat hidden can be added. It
is obvious that a governance is happening, but not as
obvious is who is governing based on what arguments.
The numbers speak for what Pelle perceives as a prob-
lem and give him the legitimacy he needs. Against this
background, the numbers appear as particularly efficient
tools for everyday governance of social work practice.
6. Internalization and Countermoves from the Social
Workers
Yvonne reads out loud what the two social workers
who are ill today had planned in in their schedule.
“Who can cover for Petra today?” Someone offers to
take Petra’s phone but cannot take the home visit.
Someone else offers to do it. Yvonne writes on the
board who covers for what activity. She puts a mark
next to one of the names. One social worker asks: “Do
you get a mark just for one home visit?” Yvonne an-
swers: “Yes, I think so”, and the social worker again:
“Well, I just want to make sure we all do the same, be-
cause yesterday, I didn’t get a mark”. Yvonne changes
her mind: “No, you’re right”, and she erases the mark.
(Field note from pulse meeting)
After the pulse boards had been used for several months,
the social workers came upwith the suggestion that they
should also visualize howmany times permonth one had
covered for a colleague. This was only one of several as-
pects the social workers thought resulted in unfair com-
parisons. For example, some stated that: “The numbers
are misleading, one assessment can take half an hour,
others you are stuck with for weeks”, or “Just because
you have zero lags it doesn’t mean that the documenta-
tions are of quality”, as this could be a result of “sloppy”
work. One social worker, who was responsible for quality
control and development at the department, explained
how she could get suspicious when colleagues repeat-
edly showed “too” good numbers.When examining their
documentations, she often found them to be of lower
quality than the others, she stated.
Thus, the social workers in my study were not gov-
erned by the numbers without any reflection or resis-
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tance. They were attentive to and had opinions about
what was visualized and compared on the board, and
continuously came up with suggestions for improve-
ments, as in the example with the marks. A reduction in
perceived complexity was met with nuancing statistics.
Several authors have expressed and given examples of
“what is counted is what counts” (Bevan & Hood, 2006).
This means that a good strategy may be to create mea-
surements that serve your own interests. When what
is visualized in numbers becomes important, it also be-
comes a matter of power and influence to take part in
the decisions about what should be measured and how
(Best, 2001). Bruno et al. (2014) called this type of coun-
termove or numeric answers to someone else’s quantifi-
cation “statactivism”, within a strategy they call “disclo-
sure”. The purpose of the move in this case is to ques-
tion or nuance what is selected as important facts by the
management, “it is the number of cases, lags, and follow-
ups that best describe the work load of the social work-
ers”, which the social workers want to nuance with the
answer: “It is also important howmany times one covers
for a colleague since this can affect your own statistics”.
This is a clear example of how negotiations around num-
bers occur, as it is important what they show, or what
part of reality they visualize.
However, it is worth noting that, even though the ex-
ample shows that the social workers want to participate
in setting the rules of the game, it is still the game that
the managers have chosen to play. The countermove
does not question the game per se, but rather confirms
and strengthens it. When the activities that the manage-
ment chose to visualize on the board were not perceived
as fairly reflecting the work distribution, a countermove
was made in terms of an addition to the model, instead
of resisting it.
7. Summary and Discussion
Building on data from ethnographic fieldwork I have in-
vestigated practices unfolding around performance mea-
surements in a social work setting. The analysis showed
how comparisons based on social workers’ relative statis-
tics can become a steering logic, guiding participants’
actions. Firstly, it was illustrated how certain conclu-
sions leading to actions are almost automatically drawn
from the numeric information presented on the board.
When participants of the study compared themselves
to each other and in relation to standards and goals,
conclusions were drawn about what should be done by
whom and in what order. The particular visualization
of the work offered by the whiteboard was illustrated
as important and motivating for some social workers.
Secondly, I showed how the number-based compara-
tive logic could take precedence as a driving force. This
was partly apparent in respondents’ postures reflecting
“pride” in accounts about rather working overtime than
handing over cases to colleagues, and partly in an inter-
action where a social worker was given instructions with
repeated reference to comparatively unfavorable num-
bers. The number-based comparative logic had become
embedded in an objectivity status, trumping any argu-
ment suggesting acting otherwise.
However, challenging theoretical approaches and
studies showing how modern management and control
systems become more sophisticated, leaving marginal
space for discretion and resistance, I could also identify
at least two different ways in which the intentions with
the pulse boards were challenged and where the “gov-
erning by comparing” was, at least partially, interrupted.
To start with: alternative logics to the one of the pulse
board were proposed. At occasions where the numbers
gave instructions for social workers to “hand over cases”,
alternative logics related to the well-being of the client,
practicalities of the overall work situation and profes-
sional values stating the opposite; “don’t mix the cases”,
were put forward. The second interruption visible in my
data came from a more “internalized” standpoint when
the social workers perceived the numbers as reductive of
the complexity in their work and chose to make a numer-
ical addition to the model. This is an initiative that in one
way reveals an acceptance of describing the work quan-
titively including exposing it on the whiteboard. At the
same time, the pulse board logic is challenged by their
claim that there is a larger and more complex story be-
hind the numbers and that they want to be a part of
the choices made about what to measure. In a critique
of theoretical approaches in the governmentality tradi-
tion, O’Malley et al. (1997, p. 510), among others, called
for studies illuminating contestation, resistance and ne-
gotiation in the typically messy and unpredictable reality
where governing happens. Even though no social worker
in this study totally refused to participate in the compara-
tive, numeric model, I have found examples of intentions
to resist and negotiate in order to shape and influence
the governing initiatives through provision of alternative
interpretations and logics.
Out of the resistance strategies appearing in this ar-
ticle, the second one, in which the professionals them-
selves applied quantification, seems to have been more
successful than resistance towards the model as such.
At the same time as this made the exercise of influence
possible, it also meant accepting a new language and a
new logic for understanding and visualizing social work.
Empirical research of the use of this language, and re-
sistance towards using it, are important topics for fu-
ture studies.
A final conclusion is that concerns about the pros
and cons of the measurements diverted attention from
client-focusedwork tasks. Questions concerning how the
social workers should relate to clients were overshad-
owed by aspects of how the work should be measured
and reported. For example, it is hard to imagine that the
added marks on the board have any meaning outside
of the internal work group. Previous studies have illumi-
nated such attention displacement at national and supra-
organizational (Bejerot & Hasselbladh, 2013) and orga-
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nizational management levels (Lynch-Cerullo & Cooney,
2011). Based on my study, similar results can be added
from the everyday perspective of the social worker.
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